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Abstract
Several contributions in the optimal taxation literature have emphasized that, when in-
dividuals￿preferences are not separable between leisure and other goods, it is desirable to
supplement a nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods. Moreover, it has
also been shown that the choice between a topping-up and an opting-out scheme depends on
whether the publicly provided good is a complement or substitute with leisure, with opting-
out (topping-up) being the preferred scheme for goods which are substitutes (complements)
for labor. In this paper, using the self-selection approach to tax analysis, we revisit these
results in the presence of tax avoidance, and investigate how public provision interacts with
the agents￿incentives to engage in tax avoidance. Three results are obtained. First, we show
that tax dodging opportunities imply that non-separability between labor and other goods
is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition to make public provision of private goods a
welfare-enhancing policy instrument. Second, we show how tax dodging opportunities limit
the scope for using topping-up provision schemes as a redistributive device. Finally, we show
that, for most of the public provision schemes previously analyzed in the literature, being a
welfare-enhancing policy instrument goes hand in hand with weakening the agents￿incentives
to shelter income from the tax authority. However, we also point out an important exception
to this pattern.
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11 Introduction
In the past couple of decades several contributions in the literature on optimal redistribu-
tive taxation have emphasized that one can get a Pareto-improvement by supplementing
the income tax with public provision of private goods.1 The intuition for the argument is
straightforward. Suppose that the economy is populated by high- and low-skilled agents
and that a government tries to redistribute from the former to the latter through a general
income tax. Under the assumption that the government cannot observe ￿who is who￿ ,
a high-skilled agent might be tempted to make himself eligible for the tax treatment in-
tended for the low-skilled agents by earning the same pre-tax income as a low-skilled agent.
Since a high-skilled agent is paid a higher wage rate than a low-skilled, such mimicking
requires that the labor supply of the former falls short of the labor supply of the latter.
Thus, if part of the transfer to the low-skilled agents is paid in-kind through the public
provision of private goods, yielding bene￿ts depending on labor supply, the incentives for
high-skilled agents to behave opportunistically might be weakened. This in turn opens the
way for the government to achieve a Pareto improvement and possibly a higher degree of
redistribution.
Necessary conditions for the above result require that the private goods candidate for
public provision are not (weakly) separable from labor in the agents￿utility function and,
once provided to an agent, cannot be resold to others. Albeit the mechanism underlying
the desirability of public provision applies both to goods that are complementary with
labor and goods that are complementary with leisure, the type of public provision scheme
that is warranted in the two cases is di⁄erent. In particular, topping-up (opting-out)
schemes have been shown to be preferable for goods that are complementary with labor
(leisure).2
In this paper, we reconsider the redistributive e⁄ects of public provision in a setting
where agents can engage in tax avoidance. In doing so, we mainly focus on the provision
of goods which are complements with labor. The reason is that the primary examples
1 See, e.g., Blomquist and Christiansen (1995), Boadway and Marchand (1995), Cremer and Gahvari
(1997) and Pirttil￿ and Tuomala (2002).
2 See Blomquist and Christiansen (1998).
2of private goods that are publicly provided in real economies, like day care services or
elderly care services, consist of goods which can be characterized as being complements
with labor. Two main results are obtained. The ￿rst is that tax dodging opportunities
imply that non-separability between labor and other goods is neither a necessary nor a
su¢ cient condition to make public provision of private goods a welfare-enhancing policy
instrument. The second result is that the availability of avoidance opportunities tends
to erode the case for topping-up public provision schemes. This might help explaining a
discrepancy between the theory and practice of public provision of private goods. In fact,
despite that many important publicly provided goods are complements with labor, actual
provision schemes often appear to be intentionally designed to limit the opportunities to
supplement.
Finally, we investigate how public provision interacts with the agents￿incentives to
engage in tax avoidance and show that, for most of the public provision schemes which have
been proposed in the literature, being a welfare-enhancing policy instrument goes hand in
hand with weakening the agents￿incentives to shelter income from the tax authority.
The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2 we analyze public provision private
goods in a simple nonlinear tax model where agents have access to a common avoidance
technology but are heterogeneous in terms of abilities. In section 3 we study how public
provision of private goods interacts with the agents￿avoidance decision. In section 4 we
extend our model to a bi-dimensional setting where agents di⁄er both in terms of ability
and in terms of opportunities to engage in tax avoidance. Section 5 o⁄ers concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
The economy has two types of agents distinguished by their (innate) earnings capacity.
The di⁄erence in ability (output per unit of work e⁄ort) is re￿ ected in the di⁄erence in
wage rates (w). The wage rate of an agent of type k (k = 1;2) is denoted wk. The total
population is normalized to unity and ￿k represents the proportion of agents of type k in
the population. Two goods (X1 and X2) are produced by a linear technology using labor
3as the only input; units are chosen to make all producer prices equal to 1.3 Preferences
are represented by the quasi-concave utility function u(x1;x2;h), where xi denotes the
consumption of commodity i and h denotes labor supply. All goods (including leisure) are
assumed to be normal. Moreover, good one cannot be resold and is therefore a potential
candidate for public provision.
The government aims at redistributing from those who are better o⁄ in the laissez
faire equilibrium to those who are worse o⁄. The informational structure of the problem
is the following. The government knows the distribution of types in the population but it
does not know the identity of the types. Therefore, type-speci￿c lump-sum taxes are ruled
out by assumption. The usual asymmetric information assumption is that the government
can observe gross income, wh, but it cannot observe separately w and h. In our model,
however, given that we allow for the possibility of tax avoidance, not even gross income
is observable. The government has to rely on reported income, denoted by M, and has
at its disposal a general income tax T (M). To model income-misreporting, we follow
the riskless approach introduced by Usher (1986) and used in a number of subsequent
contributions.4 Speci￿cally, once agents have incurred a given cost, misreporting is done at
no risk of detection in the case of (illegal) evasion. Misreporting is denoted by a de￿ned by
a ￿ wh￿M. In principle, both under-reporting (positive a) and over-reporting (negative
a) are conceivable depending on the shape of the tax schedule.5 However, one can show
that over-reporting never occurs in equilibrium. Thus, we can neglect negative values of
a. The cost of misreporting is expressed by means of the function g (a). For simplicity,
not realism, we assume that the g-function is non-negative, increasing and strictly convex;
we also assume that g (0) = g0 (0) = 0.
3 The assumption of two commodities is made to keep notation simple. The model can easily be
generalized to N > 2 commodities.
4 See e.g. Mayshar (1991), Boadway et al. (1994), Kopczuk (2001), Slemrod (2001) and Chetty (2009).
5 Over-reporting is an optimal strategy when an agent faces a negative marginal income tax rate.
Over-reporting entails in this case a rise in income transfer.
42.1 A pure income tax optimum
The problem of choosing the income tax schedule can be stated as the problem of selecting
two pairs of reported income and net-of-tax reported income
￿
Mk;Bk￿
, where by de￿nition
Bk = Mk ￿ T
￿
Mk￿
, k = 1;2.6 The government￿ s problem is to design a Pareto-e¢ cient
tax arrangement, whereby the policy variables are chosen so as to maximize the utility of
a given type of agents, subject to the other type￿ s utility being ￿xed at a pre-set level, and
subject to self-selection and revenue constraints. The self-selection constraints arise since
the government must design the tax system so that each ability type (weakly) prefers the
(M;B)-bundle intended for him/her to that intended for the other type. An agent that
misrepresents his type is called a mimicker.
Before formalizing the government￿ s problem, we address the optimization problem
solved by the agents. It is helpful to divide this problem into three stages. In the ￿rst
stage, for given values of labor supply, reported income and tax, the agent chooses the
consumption bundle, i.e. chooses the amount of xi. In the second stage the agent chooses
labor supply conditional on how much income to report and the corresponding tax. Fi-
nally, in the third stage, the agent determines how much income to report. To consider
the ￿rst stage, de￿ne Z = wh ￿ M + B ￿ g (wh ￿ M), i.e. the disposable income avail-
able for consumption after tax and net of sheltering cost. Write the utility function as
u(x1;Z ￿ x1;h). Maximizing u with respect to x1 yields the conditional demand function
x1 (Z;h) and the utility level can be expressed as u(x1 (Z;h);Z ￿ x1 (Z;h);h) = v (Z;h).
Maximizing v (Z;h) = v (wh ￿ M + B ￿ g (wh ￿ M);h) with respect to h in the second













and the second order condition d2v=dh2 < 0.
6 Note that the term ￿disposable income￿will be reserved for the income available for purchasing the
two goods as de￿ned below.
7 Notice that, since M and B are exogenously given in the second stage, in this stage there is ￿full
avoidance at the margin￿ , namely (da=dh)dM=0 = w.
5The ￿rst order condition implies that h becomes a function h(M;B;w). This gives the
indirect conditional utility function V (M;B;w). In the ￿nal stage the level of reported
income is chosen maximizing V (M;B;w) subject to the link between M and B implied
by the income tax schedule: B = M ￿ T (M). This allows us to implicitly de￿ne the
marginal income tax rate faced by an agent as:
T0 (M) = 1 +
@V=@M
@V=@B
= 1 ￿ MRSMB; (2)
where MRSMB denotes the marginal rate of substitution between M and B.
Notice also that, by invoking the envelope theorem, we have @V=@M = ￿(1 ￿ g0)@u=@x2






T0 (M) = g0 (a):8 (4)
Using V k (M;B) to denote V
￿
M;B;wk￿


















￿k ￿ R; (￿)
where Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, the ￿rst constraint requires a minimum
utility for the high-skilled agents, the second is the self-selection constraint preventing
high-skilled agents from ￿nding it in their self interest to mimic the low-skilled agents,
8 Both (3) and (4) crucially hinge on our assumptions about the cost of avoidance function, and in
particular on the assumption that g (0) = g
0 (0) = 0.
6and the last constraint is the government￿ s budget constraint, with R being an exogenous
revenue requirement.9
Using a ￿hat￿to denote a variable pertaining to a mimicker, standard manipulations of
the ￿rst order conditions of the government￿ s problem allow deriving the following results:
1 +
@V 2=@M2













Using (2) and (5) implies the standard result that the marginal tax rate faced by
the high-skilled agents is equal to zero. By (4) this also means that g0 ￿
a2￿
= 0, and
accordingly a2 = 0. Thus, the high-skilled agents truthfully report their earned income.10
The usual monotonicity property guarantees that the indi⁄erence curve of a high-skilled
mimicker is ￿ atter than the corresponding curve for a true low-skilled agent. Therefore, the
term within brackets in (6) is positive;11 invoking (2), we can conclude that (6) implies
a positive marginal tax rate for the low-skilled agents. By (4), this also means that
g0 ￿
a1￿
> 0, namely a1 > 0. Thus, the low-skilled agents under-report part of their earned
income.
2.2 Supplementing the income tax with public provision
Previous contributions analyzing the desirability of in-kind transfers in nonlinear income
taxation models have disregarded the possibility that agents misreport their earned income
to the tax authority. In such a setting it has been shown how, when the publicly provided
ration cannot be resold and agents￿preferences are not (weakly) separable between labor
9 The other self-selection constraint can be safely neglected due to the assumption that the government
redistributes from the high-skilled- to the low-skilled agents.
10 This result deserves some comments since its relevance might easily be misperceived. The result
descends from the fact that it is optimal not to distort the bundle o⁄ered to the most skilled agents, since
nobody is tempted to mimic them. Since in our simple setting we have only two types of agents, we also
get that high-skilled agents truthfully report their earned income. However, in a richer setting with several
types of agents, or in a model with a continuum of types, the no-distortion no-avoidance result would only
apply to a tiny fraction of the population. Its role would then appear more modest that in the two type
model where all high-skilled individuals are by assumption at the very top of the skill distribution.
11 We provide below a formal proof of the fact that the monotonicity property is satis￿ed in our model.
7and other goods, in-kind transfers represent a welfare-enhancing policy instrument.12 It
has also been shown that the optimal provision scheme is of an opting-out type when the
publicly provided good is a complement with leisure, whereas topping-up schemes ought
to be preferred for goods which are complements with labor.13
However, with respect to this normative result, there seems to be a discrepancy be-
tween the theory and practice of public provision of private goods. In fact, even though
the bulk of the goods which are publicly provided in real economies can be regarded as
being complements with labor, actual provision schemes often appear to be intentionally
designed to limit the opportunities to supplement. As we will clarify below, allowing for
the possibility of tax avoidance can help reconciling the theoretical prescriptions with the
practice of public provision. In particular, once dodging opportunities are accounted for,
a preference for schemes which limit the opportunities to supplement can be justi￿ed on
purely normative grounds.
To show this, assume that good one is a complement with labor and that the gov-
ernment is contemplating to use public provision of good one as an additional policy
instrument on top of the nonlinear income tax. Assume also that the public provision
scheme is of the topping-up type, with the publicly provided ration denoted by x1 and its
user charge taken to be one, namely the market price of good one.14 In a model without
tax avoidance such a public provision scheme would certainly be Pareto-improving upon a
pure income tax optimum. The intuition for the result is as follows. In the absence of tax
avoidance, a mimicker and a true low skilled agent get the same disposable income; the
only di⁄erence between them is that the mimicker, earning a higher wage rate, works less.
Thus, unless preferences are separable between labor and other goods, a mimicker and a
true low skilled agent will spend the same disposable income in di⁄erent ways. In partic-
ular, a mimicker will consume a lower amount of complementary-to-labor goods than a
12 See footnote 1.
13 See Blomquist and Christiansen (1998). The distinction between the two types of schemes hinges on
the possibility for agents to supplement the publicly provided ration with private purchases in the market.
Topping-up schemes allow for this possibility whereas with opting-out schemes an individual must either
accept the provided quantity or opt out and buy the desired quantity in the market.
14 The charge can be chosen arbitrarily since the nonlinear income tax can always accommodate it as
long as the ration is compulsory. This follows because a charge for a compulsory ration is simply a poll
tax.
8low-skilled. If the government starts publicly providing a good which is complementary to
labor, a mimicker would be the agent whose individual purchase of the publicly provided
good will ￿rst be fully crowded out. As long as the government sets a level of the ration
which is lower than or equal to the amount of the good consumed by a mimicker in the
absence of public provision, the welfare e⁄ect of the in-kind transfer is nil. If, however, the
level of the ration is raised slightly above this threshold, a mimicker is made worse o⁄while
all other agents are una⁄ected, since for them the ration is infra-marginal.15 This means
that the self-selection constraint is relaxed; therefore, the government can implement a
Pareto-improving reform.
From the reasoning above, it is clear that the key for the desirability of the topping-
up provision scheme is the fact that a mimicker works less than a low-skilled, whereas
they are identical in terms of disposable income. However, as we will now illustrate, both
circumstances are challenged by the introduction of tax avoidance. In fact, on one hand
tax avoidance implies that the mimicker￿ s disposable income is larger than that of a low-
skilled agent. On the other hand, it also implies that his labor supply might be higher
too.
Consider ￿rst the disposable income Z = wh￿M +B ￿g (wh ￿ M). Since mimicking
means reporting the same M, a mimicker would have a (weakly) smaller disposable income
than the low-skilled type (b Z ￿ Z1) if and only if he had (weakly) smaller true earnings:
w2b h ￿ w1h1, which requires that b h < h1. A further implication would be that a mimicker
would under-report a (weakly) smaller amount (b a ￿ a1).16 Denote by m the marginal rate








Where (material) consumption and leisure are both normal goods, @m(Z;h)=@Z > 0
and @m(Z;h)=@h > 0. It then follows from the inequalities above that where a mimicker
has the smaller disposable income, b m < m1, and accordingly b m=w2 < m1=w1. However,
15 Notice that a high-skilled non-mimicker has necessarily a larger disposable income and a larger labor
supply than a mimicker. Thus, a high-skilled non-mimicker will consume more than a mimicker of all
normal goods that are complementary with labor.
16 Or over-report a (weakly) larger amount.
9this ￿nding contradicts the assumption that agents are optimizing. In fact, from the ￿rst









= m=w = 1 ￿ g0 (a):
From the assumption that the g-function is convex, we have that b a ￿ a1 implies g0 (b a) ￿
g0 ￿
a1￿
, and hence 1 ￿ g0 (b a) ￿ 1 ￿ g0 ￿
a1￿
. It follows immediately that b m=w2 ￿ m1=w1,
so that we can conclude that the ￿nding that b m=w2 < m1=w1 violates the condition
for optimizing behavior. Thus, we are led to dismiss the initial assumption that w2b h ￿
w1h1 and conclude that, on the contrary, the mimicker￿ s disposable income (consumption
expenditure) exceeds that of a true low-skilled agent.17
Therefore, even assuming that a mimicker works less than a low-skilled agent, his actual
consumption of a complementary-to-labor good might be larger than that of a low-skilled
agent since he has a larger budget to spend.
Let￿ s now consider in detail how the labor supply depends on the wage rate of agents.





xi = wh ￿
M + B ￿ g (wh ￿ M). This is a utility maximization problem subject to a smooth non-
linear budget constraint. We are used to comparative statics for linear budget constraints
and know how to interpret such comparative statics. Blomquist (1989) shows how the
comparative statics for a nonlinear budget constraint can be expressed in terms of com-
parative statics for a linear budget constraint. This is accomplished by linearizing the
budget constraint and then taking account of how local prices change as a parameter of
interest is varied. In the present case we de￿ne the local (marginal) price of leisure as
w￿ = w(1 ￿ g0). As w changes the local price of leisure will change. Drawing on the
example on p. 287 in Blomquist (1989) we ￿nd that the comparative statics for dh=dw
can be written as
17 Having shown that b a > a
1 allows us to provide a simple proof of the fact that the stan-
dard agent-monotonicity condition is satis￿ed in the (M;B)-space. For this purpose, notice that by
rewriting (3) as (@V=@M)=(@V=@B) = g












1. Since we have shown that g










































where k has been de￿ned as k ￿ 1=
￿
1 + w2g00 (@h=@w￿)￿ u
￿
.
Here (@h=@w￿)￿ u is the substitution e⁄ect of a variation in the slope of a linear budget
constraint. We know that this substitution e⁄ect is positive. The term dh=dB is the
income e⁄ect for a linear budget constraint and is negative if leisure is a normal good.
Since (@h=@w￿)￿ u and g00 are both positive, 0 < k < 1. Finally, @w￿=@w = 1 ￿ g0 ￿ whg00.
Although the substitution e⁄ect for a linear budget constraint, (@h=@w￿)￿ u, is positive, the






be negative. This happens if @w￿=@w = 1 ￿ g0 ￿ whg00 < 0. Alternatively, de￿ning the
elasticity of the marginal cost of avoidance with respect to earned income as ￿ (wh) =
whg00=g0, the substitution e⁄ect is negative when ￿ > (1 ￿ g0)=g0. Thus, we see that the
sign of dh=dw depends on the size of the income- and substitution e⁄ects for a linear
budget constraint, and also on the curvature of the g function. A su¢ cient condition for
dh=dw to be negative is that @w￿=@w = 1 ￿ g0 ￿ whg00 ￿ 0. Then both the substitution
and income e⁄ects are negative. However, if @w￿=@w = 1 ￿ g0 ￿ whg00 is positive and the
substitution e⁄ect (@h=@w￿)￿ u is su¢ ciently large, it is possible that dh=dw is positive.
Summarizing, we can distinguish the following three cases:
￿ @w￿=@w ￿ 0. Then a mimicker￿ s labor supply will fall short of the labor supply of a
true low-skilled agent;
￿ @w￿=@w > 0 and (@h=@w￿)￿ u (@w￿=@w) < ￿h(1￿g0)dh=dB. In this case the income-
and substitution e⁄ects push in opposite directions but the former dominates. A
mimicker￿ s labor supply will fall short of the labor supply of a true low-skilled agent;
￿ @w￿=@w > 0 and (@h=@w￿)￿ u (@w￿=@w) > ￿h(1￿g0)dh=dB. In this case the income-
and substitution e⁄ects push in opposite directions but the latter dominates. A mim-
icker￿ s labor supply will then exceed the labor supply of a true low-skilled agent.18
18 Strictly speaking, we have assumed that, when increasing the wage rate from w
1 to w
2, none of
11With tax avoidance, a mimicker￿ s demand for complementary-to-labor goods may then
exceed that of a low-skilled agent. If this happens, the case for a public provision device of
the kind presented above breaks down. We recall that this was a scheme allowing topping
up in the market. With the mimicker being the larger consumer, public provision will have
to be abandoned or a di⁄erent provision scheme will have to be adopted, as discussed in
Blomquist and Christiansen (1998, p. 406). The public provision level should be limited
and one should block the option to top up in the market. Both measures would go against
the interests of the mimicker who wants large consumption. The mimicker will either have
to accept an inferior consumption bundle within the public scheme or forgo the public
provision by opting out of the public scheme.
In general, the demand for good one will depend both on the disposable income and
the labor supply. As special cases the demand may only depend on one argument.
Where the demand only depends on disposable income, a mimicker will have the larger
consumption (under assumption of normality of good one). In this case a topping-up provi-
sion scheme can never improve upon a pure income tax optimum. However, supplementing
the income tax with an opting-out provision scheme will certainly be welfare-improving.
It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the ￿ndings of previous literature which has neglected
tax avoidance, public provision schemes may be a useful addition to the armory of policy
instruments even when labor is weakly-separable from other goods in the agents￿utility
function.
Another special case is where the good is a necessary input in order to work such
that there is a strict relationship between x1 and h: x1 = x1 (h), with @x1=@h > 0. An
example might be day care needed by parents in order to work.19 Previous literature
has concluded that these are ideal candidate goods for being publicly provided through
either topping-up schemes or, as more recently emphasized,20 through schemes where all
agents get their entire demand for the good satis￿ed through the public provision scheme.
the e⁄ects considered above change sign. Notice that the closer we get to a continuum-type model, the
more innocuous the assumption is. The reason is that, in a continuum-type model, each of the binding
self-selection constraints involve adjacent agents whose di⁄erence in wage rates tends to zero.
19 See, for instance, Blomquist and Micheletto (2009) and Blomquist et al. (2010).
20 See Blomquist et al. (2010).
12Even though with tax avoidance we can no longer be sure that b x1 < x1
1, the fact that the
demand for X1 does not depend on disposable income suggests that tax avoidance is in
this case less likely to revert the order between the amount demanded by a mimicker and
the one demanded by a true low-skilled. In this case a topping-up public provision scheme
still stands a good chance of being a welfare-enhancing device through its e⁄ect on the
self-selection constraint.
Finally, consider the general case where the demand depends on both disposable income
and labor supply, and assume that good X1 is a normal good which is complementary with
labor (@x1=@Z > 0 and @x1=@h > 0). Denoting by ￿h;w the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to the wage rate (i.e. ￿h;w ￿ (w=h)(dh=dw)), we can distinguish the following
cases:21
￿ where dh=dw ￿ 0, we have that dx1=dw > 0;
￿ where dh=dw < 0 and h(1 ￿ g0)(1 + ￿h;w)@x1=@Z > ￿(@x1=@h)(dh=dw), we have
dx1=dw > 0;
￿ where dh=dw < 0 and h(1 ￿ g0)(1 + ￿h;w)@x1=@Z < ￿(@x1=@h)(dh=dw), we have
dx1=dw < 0.
We see that the conditions that are conducive to x1 being decreasing in w (thus war-
ranting a topping-up public provision scheme for X1) are that the income e⁄ect on x1 is
small, h is a decreasing function of w (re￿ ecting a small and conceivably negative substi-
tution e⁄ect and a strong income e⁄ect), and x1 is strongly complementary with h.
The following proposition summarizes the main ￿ndings of this subsection.
Proposition 1 In a model with income tax avoidance:
i) non-separability between labor and other goods is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient
condition to make public provision of private goods a welfare-enhancing policy instrument;
ii) even though the mimicker￿ s labor supply is not necessarily larger than that of a true
low-skilled, the fact that a mimicker avoids more than a true low-skilled implies that he
21 Notice that ￿h;w > ￿1. This is because, as we have shown above, d(wh)=dw > 0.
13will have a larger amount of income available for consumption. This tends to make the
mimicker a larger consumer of all normal goods; consequently, irrespective of the relation-
ship between leisure and the demand for a given good, it also tends to make opting-out
provision schemes superior to topping-up schemes.
3 Avoidance e⁄ects of public provision schemes
Even if what ultimately matters for the desirability of public provision is to assess whether
it can raise social welfare or not, it might also be of interest to investigate how public
provision a⁄ects the agents￿incentives to engage in tax avoidance. The answer to this
question is very simple when one considers public provision schemes of the type that
traditionally has been analyzed in the literature, namely topping-up or opting-out schemes.
For these schemes the result stated by Proposition 2 holds.
Proposition 2 Whenever topping-up or opting-out public provision schemes are welfare-
enhancing upon a pure nonlinear income tax optimum in the presence of tax avoidance,
they also exert an avoidance-discouraging e⁄ect.
The key to understand the above result is that, in an optimal nonlinear income tax
model, public provision is welfare-enhancing only insofar as it helps relaxing the binding
self-selection constraints faced by the government. Moreover, the only reason to let a
given group of agents face a non-zero marginal tax rate is to prevent mimicking by other
agents. Thus, when a topping-up or an opting-out public provision scheme can be used to
weaken a binding self-selection constraint, the government can exploit public provision in
order to lower the marginal tax rate faced by agents of a given skill type, without fearing
that higher-skilled agents will be tempted to mimic. But given that in equilibrium the
agent￿ s avoidance behavior is governed by condition (4), a reduction in the marginal tax
rate implies that the optimal level of avoidance will be reduced too.
As stressed in Proposition 2, this simple link between the welfare e⁄ect of public
provision and its e⁄ect on the incentives to shelter income from the tax authority applies
to topping-up and opting-out schemes, but does not necessarily characterize all conceivable
14public provision schemes. This can be easily illustrated by considering the public provision
scheme which was recently analyzed in Blomquist et al. (2010). Following them, assume
that the candidate for public provision, X1, is a good that does not enter as an argument
in the agents￿utility function but that is a complementary-to-labor private good which has
to be acquired by agents in order to work in the market. More precisely, assume that the
demand for good X1 is given by a function f such that x1 = f (h), with f0 > 0. Moreover,
assume that the public provision scheme is such that agents can get free of charge as
much as they need of the good, with public budget balance attained by adjusting the
labor income tax schedule. As shown by Blomquist et al. (2010) in a model without tax
avoidance, supplementing the nonlinear income tax with such a public provision scheme is
unambiguously welfare-enhancing. In a two-type model with tax avoidance, such a scheme
would still be welfare-enhancing provided that, at the pure income tax optimum, the labor
supply of a high skilled mimicker falls short of the labor supply of a true low-skilled agent.
As we know from the analysis of section 2, this might or might not happen. However,
for the sake of argument, assume that it is indeed the case that at the pure income tax
optimum the labor supply of a high skilled mimicker falls short of the labor supply of a
true low-skilled agent. A public provision scheme ￿ la Blomquist et al. (2010) would then
be welfare-enhancing but it is likely not to lead to a reduction in the marginal tax rate
faced by low-skilled agents. The reason is that under such a scheme the marginal tax
rate can be thought of as the sum of two distinct components: a distortionary component
required to deter mimicking from other types and a non-distortionary component required
to internalize the real resource cost of the good that the agents use when marginally
increasing their labor supply. As we will illustrate below, even though it is still true
that when public provision is welfare-enhancing the government is free to lower the purely
distortionary component of the marginal tax rate, a public provision scheme ￿ la Blomquist
et al. (2010) requires, for pure e¢ ciency reasons, to raise the marginal tax rate by an
amount which, albeit nondistortionary, can lead to an overall increase in the marginal tax
rate.
15Formally, given a utility function of the form u(x2;h), the agent￿ s indirect utility at a
given (M;B)-bundle and in the absence of public provision can be obtained as:
V (M;B) = max
a u
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where we have retained the assumption that the unitary resource cost of the good which
needs to be acquired in order to work is equal to one.
The ￿rst order condition is:
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Taking into account that the marginal tax rate faced by an agent is implicitly given by




























When a public provision scheme ￿ la Blomquist et al. (2010) is introduced, the agent￿ s
indirect utility at a given
￿
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-bundle can be obtained as:
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with the associated ￿rst order condition:
￿


































If the agent were to keep his behavior unchanged (i.e. if a￿￿ = a￿), both his consumption
and his leisure would be una⁄ected by the reform. However, comparing (8) and (11) one
16can easily recognize that if a￿ was a solution to (8), the avoidance level that solves (11) has
to be greater than a￿. Another way to look at this e⁄ect of the public provision scheme is
to compare (9) and (12) and to notice that the right hand side of the latter is scaled up by
f0=w as compared to the right hand side of the former. This re￿ ects the fact that, after
the introduction of the public provision scheme, the agents no longer pay a market price
for the good that they need to acquire in order to work. Given that agents do not pay in
the market for the marginal cost of X1, a purely e¢ ciency argument calls for raising their
marginal tax rate in order to internalize the marginal resource cost of the publicly provided
good. However, this increase in the marginal tax rate, albeit non-distortionary and merely
e¢ ciency-restoring, strengthen the agents￿incentives to engage in tax avoidance (given
that in equilibrium agents equate the marginal cost of avoidance with the marginal tax
rate), unless more than compensated by the reduction in the distortionary component
which is allowed by the mimicking-discouraging e⁄ect of public provision. Taking into
account that the magnitude of the nondistortionary component that needs to be added to
the marginal tax rate is larger the smaller is the wage rate of an agent, we can state the
following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When a public provision scheme ￿ la Blomquist et al. (2010) is welfare-
enhancing upon a pure nonlinear income tax optimum in the presence of tax avoidance, it
is conceivable that the agents￿incentives to engage in tax avoidance will be strengthened
as the tax on marginal income will now re￿ect the work-related costs, and the latter e⁄ect
is stronger the lower is the market wage rate of a worker.
An interesting feature of Proposition 3 is that it allows emphasizing that, from a
welfaristic standpoint, it would be misleading to gauge the desirability of public provision
on the basis of its e⁄ect on tax avoidance. The key aspect is whether or not mimicking
can be made less attractive by using a public provision scheme.
174 Allowing for bi-dimensional heterogeneity
In this section we extend our analysis of the e⁄ects of public provision by considering a set-
ting where agents also di⁄er in terms of access to avoidance opportunities. More precisely,
we ￿rst consider a three-type model with one type of high-skilled agents and two types
of low-skilled agents, those who can engage in tax sheltering (hereafter called ￿avoiders￿ )
and those who cannot engage in tax sheltering (hereafter called ￿non-avoiders￿ ). Later
we will extend the analysis to a four-type model where also high-skilled are heterogeneous
in terms of avoidance opportunities.22
However, in tackling the bi-dimensional heterogeneity problem, we simplify the analysis
by restricting attention to the public provision of a complementary-to-labor private good
the demand for which only depends on the labor supply of agents.23 Moreover, we will
focus on a provision scheme where agents get free of charge as much as they need of the
good, with public budget balance attained by adjusting the labor income tax schedule.
The reason for doing so is that, as shown by Blomquist et al. (2010), this is the optimal
provision scheme in the absence of tax avoidance.
Assume that, for each unit of labor supply, agents need to acquire one unit of a
private good that does not enter directly into the agent￿ s utility function. Assume also
that the unit cost and the market price of this complementary-to-labor private good is
p, and that agents derive utility from a composite consumption good and incur disutility
from working, u(c;h). In the absence of public provision, and for any given bundle in
the (M;B)-space, avoiders choose a to maximize u
￿












thing to notice is that if one considers the indi⁄erence curves in the (M;B)-space of two
equally skilled agents, but one being avoider and the other not, the indi⁄erence curves for
the non-avoider are more convex than those for the avoider. The slope is the same at any
bundle where the indi⁄erence curve for the non-avoider has unitary slope (since at those
22 One might for instance interpret the di⁄erence in the access to avoidance opportunities as a re￿ ection
of a di⁄erence in occupational status, such as that between self-employed and employees.
23 As emphasized by Blomquist et al. (2010), this modelling assumption ￿ts reasonably well some
prominent examples of private goods that are publicly provided in real economies.
18bundles the potential avoiders have no incentives to misreport their income). To the left,
the indi⁄erence curve for the avoider is steeper since the avoider is under-reporting income
(therefore having both higher consumption and higher labor supply);24 to the right, the
indi⁄erence curve for the avoider is ￿ atter since the avoider is over-reporting income.25
Ideally, the government would like to o⁄er di⁄erent bundles to the low-skilled avoiders
and the low-skilled non-avoiders. To realize that this is the case, consider the following.
In a standard two-type optimal nonlinear taxation model (without avoidance) the low-
skilled agents face a positive marginal tax rate in order to discourage the high-skilled
agents from mimicking. Now, if we introduce low-skilled avoiders and assume that they
are pooled together with the low-skilled non-avoiders, we would get that the avoiders
enjoy a higher utility (since they under-report part of their income whereas the other
group of low-skilled agents cannot do that). Thus, under reasonable social preferences
for redistribution, the government would like to transfer resources from the low-skilled
avoiders to the low-skilled non-avoiders. However, Figure 1 below shows that the presence
of high-skilled agents (with the associated binding self-selection constraint requiring them
not to mimic low-skilled agents) prevents the government from being able to separate the
two types of low-skilled agents.26
24 At these bundles the implicit marginal tax rates faced by agents is positive; thus, those who have
the opportunity will under-report their true income (a > 0). The marginal rate of substitution between






@u=@c. With both h and c being larger for the avoider, the marginal rate
of substitution (and therefore the slope of the indi⁄erence curve in the (M;B)-space) is higher for the
avoider.
25 At these bundles the implicit marginal tax rates faced by agents is negative; thus, those who have
the opportunity will over-report their true income (a < 0). The marginal rate of substitution between






@u=@c. With both h and c being smaller for the avoider, the marginal rate
of substitution (and therefore the slope of the indi⁄erence curve in the (M;B)-space) is smaller for the
avoider.
26 For the moment it is not crucial to specify whether the high-skilled agents can engage in tax avoidance
or not.
19Figure 1
In Figure 1 the dashed line indicates the indi⁄erence curve for the low-skilled non-
avoiders; the steepest indi⁄erence curve passing through the A-bundle pertains to the
low-skilled avoiders. All low-skilled agents are pooled at the A-bundle and the high-skilled
agents are located at the B-bundle. Starting from this equilibrium, we can ask whether it
is possible to get a Pareto-improvement by separating the two types of low-skilled agents.
For this purpose, let￿ s keep ￿xed the utility of the high-skilled agents and that of the low-
skilled avoiders, and consider whether it is possible to raise the utility of the low-skilled
non-avoiders by o⁄ering them a bundle di⁄erent from A. One way to raise the utility
of the low-skilled non-avoiders would be to o⁄er them a bundle in the area labelled D.
However, this would violate the self-selection constraint requiring high-skilled agents to be
prevented from mimicking. An alternative way to raise the utility of the low-skilled non-
avoiders would be to o⁄er them a bundle in the area labelled C. There are two problems
in this case: on one hand the government￿ s revenue would be reduced if the low-skilled
non-avoiders were to relocate in this area;27 on the other hand, if the low-skilled non-
27 This happens because at the A-bundle the slope of the indi⁄erence curve of the low-skilled non-avoiders
20avoiders were o⁄ered a bundle in the area labelled C, the low-skilled avoiders would have
an incentive to choose that bundle too.
Having shown that all the low-skilled agents are pooled together at a pure income tax
optimum, let￿ s consider the introduction of a public provision scheme of the type described
at the beginning of this section. It is easy to realize that it would favor the low-skilled
avoiders more than the low-skilled non-avoiders (since they are pooled together but the
avoiders supply more labor).28 This feature of the public provision scheme is unattractive.
To assess the e⁄ect of the provision scheme on the self-selection constraint, two cases
need to be distinguished. Where the high-skilled agents do not have avoidance oppor-
tunities, the provision scheme softens the self-selection constraint. This occurs because
a mimicker is forced to pay for more than the publicly provided good that he consumes.
However, where the high-skilled agents have avoidance opportunities, it is conceivable that
the ability of this type of provision scheme to relax the self-selection constraint is being
eroded since high-skilled mimickers may not be working less than the low-skilled agents.
Indeed, if they work strictly longer hours, this particular public provision scheme will
tighten rather than soften the self-selection constraint with detrimental e⁄ects on welfare.
Before proceeding to the four-type model, notice that an opting-out scheme could
overcome the problems of the provision scheme considered above. The reason is that an
opting-out scheme could be tailored to the need of the low-skilled non-avoiders, therefore
making the bundle intended for them less tempting both for the low-skilled avoiders and
the high-skilled. Thus, it would allow separating the low-skilled non-avoiders from the
low-skilled avoiders in a way that favors the former without inducing mimicking from the
high-skilled agents.
Consider now a four-type model where also high-skilled agents are di⁄erentiated in
terms of avoidance opportunities. One possibility is that, at a pure income tax optimum,
is smaller than one (their labor supply is distorted downwards to prevent mimicking from the high-skilled
agents).
28 To balance the public budget for the introduction of the public provision scheme, one needs to reduce
the after-tax incomes associated with the bundles o⁄ered to the various agents. Suppose that the after-
tax income of the bundle for the high-skilled agents is reduced by an amount equal to the cost of the
publicly provided good that they consume, so that their utility is left una⁄ected. The reduction in the
after-tax income of the bundle for the low-skilled agents, required to achieve public budget balance, will
then necessarily entail a cross subsidy from the low-skilled non-avoiders to the low-skilled avoiders.
21all high-skilled agents are pooled together and faced with no distortion in order to extract
the maximum amount of revenue from them. There is a strong case for this outcome since
both e¢ ciency and equity are achieved as far as high-skilled agents are concerned.29 The
situation is illustrated in Figure 2 where there is bunching of high-skilled agents at point
B and a cluster of low-skilled at A.30
Figure 2
Given that the indi⁄erence curve for the high-skilled non-avoiders is more convex than
the one for the high-skilled avoiders, the relevant binding self-selection constraint would be
the one requiring the high-skilled avoiders not to mimic the (pooled) low-skilled agents. As
above, the public provision scheme considered in Blomquist et al. (2010) would exacerbate
the self-selection constraint if the high-skilled avoiders were to supply, as mimickers, more
labor than the low-skilled agents.
However, there might be circumstances where a pure income tax optimum is not char-
acterized by pooling all high-skilled agents at an undistorted bundle. Especially when
29 This implies that the all high-skilled agents would get the same utility (they would have the same con-
sumption and the same labor supply). Thus, the government would have no reason to wish to redistribute
from one type of high-skilled agents to the other type.
30 The indi⁄erence curves drawn as solid (dashed) lines are for avoiders (non-avoiders).
22the proportion of potential avoiders is small among high-skilled agents, renouncing the
attractive properties of pooling the high-skilled at an undistorted bundle may be more
than o⁄set by bene￿ts in other respects. To realize the potential for such favorable ef-
fects, consider again Figure 2. We notice that the slopes of the indi⁄erence curves of the
low-skilled types through A are less than unity, which is the slope of the 45-degree line
drawn through A. Moving the bunching point north-east along the steeper indi⁄erence
curve (of the low-skilled avoiders) will increase tax revenue (with the reported income M
increasing more than the net-of-tax reported income B). Obviously, such a move is only
feasible if the high-skilled agents with avoidance opportunities are allowed to mimic, i.e.
if they are pooled with the low-skilled agents. The new equilibrium is depicted in Figure
3 where high-skilled non avoiders locate at bundle B whereas all other agents are located
at bundle A.
Figure 3
In this new equilibrium more resources will have to be allocated to the high-skilled
avoiders, but if the proportion of this group of high-skilled agents is negligible, the cost
will be insigni￿cant and dominated by the increase in tax revenue pointed out above. In
23general, there will be a trade-o⁄ between the two opposing e⁄ects but still the change
in the pooling equilibrium will be favorable on balance with a su¢ ciently small number
of high-skilled agents capable of avoidance. In these circumstances we are back to the
case where the provision scheme considered in Blomquist et al. (2010) would undoubtedly
slacken the remaining self-selection constraint.31 Moreover, especially if the labor supply
of the high-skilled avoiders is lower than the labor supply of the low-skilled non-avoiders
at the pure income tax optimum, the introduction of the public provision scheme may
also imply that it becomes once again desirable to pool all the high-skilled agents at an
undistorted bundle.32
Finally, we can notice that, irrespective of whether the high-skilled avoiders are pooled
or not with the low-skilled agents at the pure income tax optimum, an opting-out scheme
o⁄ers advantages over the provision scheme considered above. Once again, the reason is
that an opting-out scheme can be tailored to the need of the low-skilled non-avoiders.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have reconsidered the desirability of public provision of private goods as
a redistributive device in optimal nonlinear income tax models.
We have shown that tax avoidance implies that non-separability between labor and
other goods is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition to make public provision of
private goods a welfare-enhancing policy instrument.
A second result is that the availability of avoidance opportunities tends to make opting-
out provision schemes welfare-superior to topping-up schemes. Given that the empirical
evidence indicates that tax dodging opportunities depend on features of a country￿ s eco-
nomic structure such as the extent to which earned income is subject to information
reporting from third parties and the average size of ￿rms (see, e.g., Kleven et al. (2009)
and Kleven et al. (2011)), a potential policy implication of our analysis is that topping-
31 However, it would still be the case that the public provision scheme has the unappealing e⁄ect of
favoring the low-skilled avoiders more than the low-skilled non-avoiders. Moreover, depending on the labor
supply of the high-skilled avoiders, it can also favor them more than the low-skilled agents.
32 This is due to the fact that the public provision scheme softens the incentive for the high-skilled
avoiders to mimic the low-skilled agents.
24up public provision schemes have a better chance of being welfare-enhancing in countries
where the share of self-employed is relatively small and the average size of ￿rms is relatively
big.
Finally, we have investigated how public provision interacts with the agents￿incentives
to engage in tax avoidance and have shown that, for most of the public provision schemes
previously studied in the literature, being a welfare-enhancing policy instrument goes hand
in hand with softening the agents￿incentives to shelter income from the tax authority.
However, we have also pointed out an important exception to this pattern.
Our modelling of tax avoidance has been very crude. In some cases the marginal
net tax-saving is less than the marginal gross tax-saving (T0) because part of the income
tax avoided is appropriated by the government through some other tax channel. For
instance, where income shifting takes place, income taxed at a high marginal rate T0 may
be transformed at a real resource cost g (a) to income taxed at a lower marginal rate t.
Then the marginal private cost of the (gross) tax-saving T0 is t+g0, where only the latter
term (g0) is a social cost. This way of modelling avoidance would allow studying how the
government￿ s design of a given tax interacts with the incentives for agents to avoid other
taxes.
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